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When In Doubt, Take Them Out: Removal of Children from 
Victims of Domestic Violence Ten Years After Nicholson v. 
Williams1 
LYNN F. BELLER* 
INTRODUCTION 
“[C]onsider what it means when the same court system that threatens to remove 
a woman’s children because she has exposed them to an abusive partner also 
tells her, if only by example, that they will not punish a man who has assaulted 
her dozens, perhaps hundreds of times.”2 
Domestic violence is the leading cause of injury to women in the U.S.3  Far 
more Americans, mostly women, have been killed in the last dozen years at the 
hands of their partners than in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.4  Worldwide, 
women ages 15 to 44 are more likely to die or be maimed as a result of male 
violence than as a consequence of war, cancer, malaria and traffic accidents 
combined.5 
Since the passage of the Violence Against Women Act in 1994, federal, state 
and city agencies have made efforts to combat domestic violence.  In New York 
State in particular, Governor Andrew Cuomo created the Office for the 
Prevention of Domestic Violence6 and former Mayor Michael Bloomberg created 
the Mayor’s Office to Combat Domestic Violence.7  Until 2002, however, mothers 
who had been victims of domestic violence in New York were often victimized 
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twice: first by their abusers, and then by having their children taken away from 
them.. 
On March 18, 2002, Judge Jack Weinstein dramatically changed New York 
policy towards victims of domestic abuse.8  With his sweeping decision in 
Nicholson v. Williams,9 he concluded that a mother’s inability to prevent her 
children from witnessing domestic violence does not in itself constitute neglect, 
and therefore cannot be the sole basis for an administrative agency’s removal of 
her children from their family home.10  The court found that administrative 
agencies in New York had perpetrated a number of wrongs against battered 
mothers, including failing to provide the necessary services to ensure the 
protection of the mothers and children, and “unnecessarily routinely 
prosecut[ing] mothers for neglect and remov[ing] their children where the 
mothers have been the victims of significant domestic violence, and where the 
mothers themselves have done nothing wrong.”11 This decision was 
subsequently upheld by the New York Court of Appeals, which held that merely 
witnessing violence does not rise to the level of neglect that automatically 
necessitates emergency removal, even though the emotional injury to a child that 
results from witnessing domestic violence can satisfy the definition of a 
“neglected child” and require the emergency removal of that child without a 
court order.12 
The plaintiffs’ circumstances in the Nicholson case were illustrative of the 
“flawed understanding of domestic violence”13 that permeated the child welfare 
system and prevented the appropriate treatment of mothers who were victims of 
domestic violence.  This article explains the holdings of the Nicholson cases and 
explores why there are still instances where the practices of New York State’s 
Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS”) victimize mothers.  ACS has 
changed its policies and practices in the past ten years and has made some 
improvement in holding abusers accountable.  Nevertheless, ACS employees 
continue to regularly allege neglect against battered mothers, who are much 
easier targets.  ACS still consistently fails to offer adequate services to victims of 
domestic violence before prosecuting them or removing their children.  ACS 
employees are often too ready to judge victims and are frequently not equipped 
to make sensitive decisions. 
To understand why these practices continue even after the clear holding in 
Nicholson, we must examine the institutional and psychological factors that 
provide resistance to change. As with any large bureaucracy, ACS policies are 
inevitably designed to preserve the organization.  The risk to the organization of 
leaving a child in a family environment that ends up being fatal with the ensuing 
headline-grabbing publicity lurks in the background of the decision-making 
 
 8.  Dorchen A. Leidholdt, Director, Center for Battered Women’s Legal Services,, Sanctuary for 
Families, Remarks at the Edith I. Spivack Award Ceremony, New York County Lawyers’ 
Association’s Women’s Rights Committee(Apr. 4, 2013) (transcript available at 
https://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications1607_0.pdf).  
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 11.  Id.at 228-29.  
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process. This risk may place unconscious pressure on ACS employees to err on 
the side of caution.  In addition, a large case load adds to the pressure to resolve 
situations rapidly, without gaining a full understanding of the dynamics of 
domestic violence.  Without such an understanding, it is difficult to evaluate 
whether the violence is a one-time event or a continuing pattern of abuse and to 
develop alternatives for the family. 
Part I of this article reviews the dynamics of the “stubborn problem” of 
domestic violence and why abused women are often unable to leave their 
batterers.  Part II examines the system of child welfare in New York and explains 
the ways in which aspects of the system have influenced the approach child 
protective workers take to resolve the problem.  Part III explores the holdings of 
the Nicholson cases and their influence on the policies regarding removal of 
children.  Part IV examines several recent instances where victims have been 
improperly treated by ACS employees.  Part V concludes with recommendations 
for potential improvements to the system. 
I. UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
“His jealousy soon escalated to violence, and Camila was trapped in cycles of 
abuse, separation, reunion and greater abuse. She suffered a slow destruction of 
her sense of self: “I felt like a worm,” she says, “ugly, black, good for nothing. I 
felt no one else would love me.”14 
Domestic violence is a pattern of gender-based intimate partner abuse, 
designed to harm the physical and psychological well-being of the victims.  
Despite increased awareness of the effects of domestic violence in the legal 
system and society at large, and despite efforts of advocacy organizations like 
Sanctuary for Families,15 Legal Momentum, and Safe Horizons, domestic 
violence remains a challenging problem. According to the World Health 
Organization, “thirty-five percent of women worldwide have been sexually 
assaulted or subjected to domestic violence.”16 Domestic violence “strikes one 
American woman in four and claims a life in the United States every six hours. . . 
American women are twice as likely to suffer domestic violence as breast cancer, 
and the abuse is particularly shattering because it comes from those we have 
loved.”17 A woman is beaten every 15 seconds in the United States.18  As 
Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus R. Vance noted recently, “domestic violence 
[has] remained a stubborn problem in the city even as murder, assault and other 
violent crimes have fallen significantly in the last decade.  The office prosecuted 
6,500 cases in 2013, up from 5,600 a decade ago.”19  The movement to combat 
domestic violence in the U.S. began in the 1970s when advocates for women 
 
 14.  SANCTUARY FOR FAMILIES, http://www.sanctuaryforfamilies.org/index.php?option=com_ 
content&task=view&id=153&Itemid=176 (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).  
 15.  The author of this article served on the Board of Trustees for Sanctuary for Families from 
2004-2013.  
 16.  Nicholas Kristof, How Brave Girls Helped Crack a Taboo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2014, at A27.  
 17.  Id.   
 18.  National Domestic Violence Statistics, supra note 3.  
 19.  James C. McKinley, Jr., Center That Aids Domestic Violence Victims Opens in Manhattan, N.Y. 
TIMES Mar. 12, 2014, at A25.  
Beller_Spring 2015 (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  7:46 PM 
208 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 22:205 2015 
began to focus on creating emergency shelters for victims of domestic violence 
and their children.20  Activists began to turn to the civil and criminal justice 
systems to hold abusers accountable.  Non-profit organizations focusing for the 
first time on this issue effectively implemented societal, cultural, and legal 
changes to improve the safety and security of women in intimate relationships. 
Legal efforts included enforcement of existing civil and criminal legal remedies 
for victims of domestic violence, and the development of additional remedies to 
respond to the needs of victims. Training of police, prosecutors, and judges in 
ways to identify domestic violence, and how to collect evidence and present it in 
court, led to improved enforcement of state and federal criminal laws.21 
The 1990s brought further dramatic improvements for victims.  In 1994, 
Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which was the first 
national-level, comprehensive legal response to domestic violence and required 
the interstate enforcement of civil protection orders.22  In the same year, New 
York State passed the Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act, 
which eliminated the need for victims to choose between civil and criminal 
remedies.  This act also “imposed a state-wide mandatory arrest law, requiring 
police officers to make an arrest for domestic violence felonies, violations of stay-
away orders of protection, and family offenses committed in violation of an 
order of protection.”23 
Despite these achievements, there is a continued lack of understanding of 
the dynamics of domestic violence on the part of the judiciary, law enforcement, 
welfare agencies and the general public.  Domestic violence manifests not only in 
physical assault, but also through a pattern of intimidation, isolation and control 
over victims.  As Dr. Evan Stark has stated: 
[W]e have come to realize that the most devastating context for battering is when 
minor physical abuse is embedded in a pattern that deprives women of basic 
rights and resources, exploits them sexually and often monetarily, isolates them 
from friends, family, professionals and other potential sources of support, and 
implements a regime of regulation over everyday affairs.24 
This kind of coercive control is not always apparent to an outside viewer.  
The abuser gains access to an intimate knowledge of the victim’s life, and uses 
that knowledge to control the victim even he is not with her.  He knows her 
habits, her fears, and her extended family. This intimate knowledge allows 
batterers to manipulate the emotions of victims and to use their knowledge to 
create problems in their lives. 
Domestic violence encompasses many kinds of abusive behavior.  
Perpetrators use a variety of psychological activities to intimidate their victims, 
including brandishing weapons, threats of harm against the victim and her 
family, and threats to kidnap the victim’s children.  Abusers try to isolate their 
 
 20.  Julie A. Domonkos, The Evolution of the Justice System’s Response to Domestic Violence in New 
York State in LAWYER’S MANUAL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPRESENTING THE VICTIM, 1 (Jill Laurie 
Goodman & Dorchen A. Leidholdt eds., 5th ed. 2006).  
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Domonkos, supra note 20, at 1-2.  
 24.  Stark, supra note 2, at 713.  
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victims and limit their contact with others.25  They misinform their victims, 
through tactics such as lying and withholding information about the victims’ 
ability to legally remain in the U.S. or their ability to retain custody of their 
children.  Coercive and violent sex, as well as other forms of physical abuse, are 
typical.  Batterers also often use the legal system against the victim, by 
threatening deportation, as well as by threatening to report drug abuse and 
falsely reporting the victim to law enforcement so the victim is forced to defend 
herself instead of protecting herself from the abuser.  As we will see in detail 
below, the abuser may threaten to file reports or actually file reports with social 
service agencies to make the victim appear to be a neglectful mother.  The abuser 
may also prevent the victim from becoming financially self-sufficient in order to 
maintain power and control. 
A common misconception of outside observers is the belief that a battered 
woman can leave an abusive relationship if she really wants to. This view makes 
intuitive sense, but it ignores emotional, financial and other barriers that prevent 
women from leaving.26  For example, if the abuser is the sole income provider in 
the family, a mother may reject leaving as an option and put the financial well-
being of her children ahead of her own safety.  There is a shortage of shelters 
specifically for women and children fleeing an abuser, and they are often forced 
to stay in homeless shelters.  Rather than subjecting her children to such a 
dangerous environment, a woman may decide to remain with her abuser.  A 
woman may also stay in a violent relationship because she believes that leaving 
would place her and her children at an even greater risk of harm.  There is 
evidence to support such fears, since “the risk of femicide increases directly after 
separation.”27 Batterers escalate the violence when a woman tries to leave or 
shows signs of independence.28  Studies show that “[N]early 90 percent of 
intimate partner homicides by men have been shown to involve a documented 
history of domestic violence, and a majority of these killings take place during or 
following separation.”29 
Women often stay due to legal and immigration concerns, fear of losing 
their children, cultural or religious prohibitions on divorce, or a lack of family 
support for the transition.30 Some victims start off as victims of sex trafficking 
and don’t speak English.31  Some victims reason that they will sacrifice 
themselves so their children will have a father or a home: “She stayed with a 
 
 25.  See infra Part 5(c). 
 26.  Susan McGee, Why Battered Women Stay [Actually, Why Some Battered Women Sometimes Stay], 
STOPVIOLENCE.COM, http://stopviolence.com/domviol/whytheystay.htm (last visited Feb, 16, 2015).  
 27.  Colleen Friend, Aron Shlonsky & Liz Lambert, From Evolving Discourses to New Practice 
Approaches in Domestic Violence and Child Protective Services, 30 CHILD.. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. , 689, 
690 (2008).  See also Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of 
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 65-6 (1991) (developing the term “separation assault” to describe the 
intensified violent assault an abuser inflicts upon his victim as punishment for her attempting to 
leave the relationship).  
 28.  LUNDY BANCROFT, JAY G. SILVERMAN &DANIEL RITCHIE, THE BATTERER AS PARENT: 
ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS 14 (2d ed. 2011). 
 29.  Id. at 14. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Interviews with Dorchen Leidholdt, Director of the Center for Battered Women’s Legal 
Services, Sanctuary for Families. 
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violent boyfriend for years, she said, because he was the father of her daughters 
and was always so apologetic afterward—and also because that was what she 
had been told was a woman’s lot in life.”32  Even after they leave, victims may 
still believe that their children need involvement with the father.  Some victims 
stay because there is no other place for them to go.  There are also more subtle 
psychological reasons why victims remain in abusive situations.  A batterer 
creates a feeling of powerlessness in his victim and may force her to believe she 
must choose between her own safety and that of her children. In conclusion, a 
woman who remains with her children in a violent environment is not 
necessarily neglecting her children.  She may be weighing two bad alternatives 
and choosing the lesser of two evils. 
II. THE CONCEPT OF THE FAILURE TO PROTECT 
“[C]hild protection is predisposed by its mission, programmatic structure and 
peculiar role in our society to allow and may even compel even its most 
progressive personnel to engage in morally and constitutionally indefensible 
practices with respect to mothers. . .”33 
In situations of abuse, law enforcement and advocacy efforts are focused on 
protecting the victim from the abuser.  When the victim is a mother, such efforts 
intuitively should involve protection of the entire family.  Unfortunately, a 
misplaced effort to protect children from the impact of witnessing domestic 
violence has resulted in an injustice perpetrated on mothers.  In New York City, 
the Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS”), the nation’s largest Child 
Protective Services (“CPS”) agency, has engaged in the presumptive removal of 
children from battered mothers. CPS has charged these victims with neglect on 
the theory that they “engaged” in acts of domestic violence and failed to protect 
their children from witnessing such acts.  Consequently, “victims of domestic 
violence often suffer dual abuse, first in the hands of their assailants, and then in 
the hands of the system.”34 
A. Child Protection in New York 
While there are federal guidelines and requirements for child protection,35 
the primary responsibility for such protection rests with each state.36  The system 
of child protection in New York is complicated and multilayered.  Child abuse is 
defined in New York in the Social Services Law37 and the Family Court Act.38  
 
 32.  Kristof, supra note 4.  
 33.  Stark, supra note 2, at 693. 
 34.  Beth A. Mandel, The White Fist of the Child Welfare System: Racism, Patriarchy, and the 
Presumptive Removal of Children from Victims of Domestic Violence in Nicholson v. Williams, 73 U. CIN.LL. 
REV. 1131, 1131 (2005).  
 35.  See Major Federal Legislation Concerned with Child Protection, Child Welfare, and Adoption, 
CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY 1 (April 2012), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs 
/majorfedlegis.pdf. (“The Federal Government started providing grants to States for preventive and 
protective services and foster care payments in 1935 with the Child Welfare Services Program, Title 
IV-B of the Social Security Act.”)  
 36.  Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).  
 37.  N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 412 (McKinney 2014).  
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Section 1012(f) of the New York Family Court Act defines a neglected child as 
one “whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in 
imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his 
parent. . .to exercise a minimum degree of care.”39 The minimum degree of care 
includes supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, and education 
as well as providing proper supervision.40 The Act gives broad authority to the 
state to investigate and protect against child abuse and neglect.41 
The failure-to-protect doctrine stems from the premise that parents have an 
obligation to protect their children from avoidable harm.42  Prior to the Nicholson 
case, physical violence perpetrated by one parent against another could 
constitute child neglect.43 As late as 1998, the statutory requirement that actual 
harm or substantial risk of harm to the child be proven could be met by the mere 
presence of domestic violence:44  “‘Failure to protect’ [charges] . . . arise when 
parents do not prevent another person from abusing the children in their care, or 
even when they permit these children to watch them being abused.”45  It is 
important to note that defendants charged and convicted with failure to protect 
are almost exclusively female.  “As one advocate stated, ‘In the 16 years I’ve 
worked in the courts, I have never seen a father charged with failure to protect 
when the mom is the abuser.  Yet, in virtually every case where Dad is the 
abuser, we charge Mom with failure to protect.’”46  Cases involving “failure to 
protect” typically evidence the view that the mother did not perform her 
“maternal” role adequately to prevent the child from experiencing the abuse.  
Often the mother is herself a victim of abuse, and the courts may consider that 
she therefore knew or should have known about the batterer’s tendency to abuse.  
However, “[s]uch decisions ignore the special circumstances of battered women, 
which courts have considered in other contexts, such as when women are tried 
for murdering their abusers.”47  Studies of state courts reveal a substantive 
gender bias in abuse proceedings:48  “In 46.2% of the cases in which ACS files a 
petition of neglect or abuse involving domestic violence, the batterer is not listed 
at all, meaning that in these cases, the victim is held by the system to answer for 
the batterer’s abuse.”49 
The predominance of women as persons charged with child abuse and 
neglect is often overlooked because we have become so accustomed to seeing 
 
 38.  N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1012 (McKinney 2014).  
 39.  Id. at (f).  
 40.  Id.  
 41.  See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1012 practice cmt., (McKinney 2014). 
 42.  Friend, Shlonsky & Lambert, supra note 27, at 690. 
 43.  David Lansner, The Nicholson Decisions: New York’s Response to ‘Failure to Protect’ Allegations, 
ABA COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications 
/cdv_enewsletter_home/vol12_expert1.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).  
 44.  See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1012 practice cmt, (McKinney 2014).  
 45. Jeanne A. Fugate, Note, Who’s Failing Whom? A Critical Look at Failure-to-Protect Laws, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV.. 272, 273 (2001).  
 46.  Id.at 274.  
 47.  Id. at 280.  
 48.  Id. at 287.  
 49.  Mandel, supra note 34, at 1143. 
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women in the courtrooms of Family Court.  This ubiquity has led to an 
internalization of the “bad mother” as the “person who is brought into Family 
Court on child protection charges, and [a] compar[ison of] her to the mythical 
‘ideal mother’ who would never be charged with any kind of child abuse or 
neglect.”50 Commentators have noted that there is also an “implicit motherhood 
bias”51 in the child welfare system. 
For an example of an implicit motherhood bias being harmful in a Family 
Court proceeding, imagine that a judge carries stereotypes about a ‘good’ mother 
being selfless and subjugating her own needs to those of her children, and a ‘bad’ 
mother as one who is putting some other need before her children’s needs. Now, 
when that judge is presiding over actual cases, she is implicitly seeing a 
particular litigant as a ‘bad mother,’ if, for instance, the litigant uses illegal drugs, 
or if she is in love with and lives with a batterer, or, perhaps, even if she works 
the night shift.52 
Similarly, when case workers interact with a mother who is a victim of 
abuse, they are unconsciously evaluating her parenting ability against an ideal 
image of the perfect mother. 
In addition, the issue of racial bias plays a role in the system. Scholars 
observing the Family Court “have long criticized the overrepresentation of low-
income litigants of color, characterizing Family Court as the ‘poor person’s 
court,’ and have questioned whether the family law system itself is inherently 
discriminatory toward persons of color.”53  In 2002, black individuals constituted 
13% of the population as a whole, while comprising 37% of the foster care 
population.54 Various scholars and practitioners have referred to the child 
welfare system as an “apartheid institution.”55  Discussion of this problem is 
beyond the scope of this article, but remains fertile ground for further 
exploration. 
B.  ACS Policy in New York 
The child protection system in New York State begins with the Office of 
Children and Family Services (“OCFS”), which regulates and monitors local 
service agencies and maintains the State Central Register for Child Abuse and 
Maltreatment (“SCR”).  The State delegates responsibility for enforcing child 
protection laws to counties and municipalities. 56  New York State is divided into 
fifty-eight local social services districts. The five boroughs of New York City 
comprise one district.  In New York City, the primary agency responsible for 
protecting children against abuse is ACS.57 
 
 50.  Melissa L. Breger, The (In)visibility of  Motherhood  in Family Court Proceedings, 36 N.Y.U..REV. 
LL. & SOC. CHANGE 555, 556 (2012).  
 51.  Id. at 559.  
 52.  Id.at 565-66.  
 53.  Id. at 557. 
 54.  Mandel, supra note 34, at 1150.  
 55.  Id. at 1149.  
 56. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 166 (E.D.N.Y.2002).  
 57. NYC ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES, http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/html 
/home/home.shtml. 
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The State Central Register is the conduit through which all investigations 
regarding child abuse and neglect are initiated.  The Register maintains a hotline, 
and the most common way a case is initiated is when someone makes a report of 
abuse or neglect. Reports come in from “mandated reporters” or anyone who 
suspects or claims to suspect that a child is being abused or maltreated.58  There 
is no screening of calls to the hotline, and therefore reporting can become an 
effective tool for batterers to keep control of their victims.  For example, a caller 
can report a mother for allegedly neglecting to take her child on scheduled 
doctor’s visits.  Victims can be subject to repeat ACS investigations triggered by 
calls to the hotline based solely on inventions of the batterers, and “[a] person 
who makes a report is immune from liability even if the report is eventually 
proven false.”59 
Once a call comes in with allegations of suspected child abuse or neglect, 
the report is transmitted to the local child protective services, like ACS.  When an 
ACS field office receives a report from SCR, an employee forwards it to a 
supervisor (“Supervisor”). The Supervisor assigns a caseworker to investigate.  
The investigation must take place within twenty-four hours of the report.  A 
“Child Protective Manager” (“CPM”), who oversees the Supervisor-Caseworker 
team, “approves major decisions such as removing a child or prosecuting a 
mother.”60 
ACS is responsible for completing its investigations of complaints referred 
by SCR within sixty days.61  ACS caseworkers will visit the home, interview the 
parents and children and determine whether there is a risk of harm to the 
children. When the investigation is completed, ACS must determine whether any 
evidence supports the allegations. If ACS concludes there is such evidence, it 
declares the report “indicated” and transmits its conclusions and supporting 
reasons to SCR.62 There is no formal hearing at which the parents have the right 
to be heard before the report is filed.63 
If there is a risk, ACS must decide whether a child must be removed or 
whether provision of services may be sufficient to prevent removal.  In theory, 
ACS may remove a child only if it first made appropriate and reasonable efforts 
to prevent or eliminate the need for removal.”64  The reality confronted by the 
Nicholson court was that ACS was routinely removing children without such 
efforts.65 
No department has responsibility for independently assessing the ACS 
conclusion and there is no formal hearing to evaluate the decision.66  A report of 
“indicated” can have severe consequences on an individual’s record. While SCR 
is required to keep report records confidential, many individuals and 
 
 58. Lecture notes of  Dorchen Leidholdt, Adjunct Professor, Columbia Law School(Feb. 6, 2015). 
 59.  Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 166.  
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id.  
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Id. at 167.  
     65.     Id.  
 65.  See id. at 211 (explaining that ACS fails to offer adequate services to mothers before 
prosecuting them or removing their children).   
 66.  Id. at 166. 
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organizations are statutorily authorized to access the records.67  Therefore, a 
report of “indicated” may have consequences for an individual’s employment, 
educational and financial opportunities. 
If ACS determines that a child is at risk of harm, there is an obligation to 
prepare a “family service plan” to attempt to avert that risk.  The agency must 
provide preventive services, including cash assistance, the assignment of a 
homemaker, and provision of parenting classes and rent subsidies.  If there is 
domestic violence, the caseworker can assist the victim to obtain an order of 
protection, provide counseling services and find an emergency shelter.68 
The evidence in the Nicholson case revealed that many caseworkers 
displayed a lack of understanding or awareness of domestic violence.  As Judge 
Weinstein noted:  
[T]he father claimed the inherent right to beat his wife and children. . .He claims 
that he is verbally and physically abusive for the cardinal reason of maintaining 
order and good behavior among his family members. Despite this report, ACS 
did not help Ms. Udoh [one of the plaintiffs] leave or attempt to remove Mr. 
Udoh from the household, or limit his contact with his wife or children.69 
If a caseworker believes that there is a risk of physical injury or harm to a 
child, they are permitted to remove the child from the household.  Removal for 
more than twenty-four hours requires the commencement of an Article 10 
proceeding in Family Court to have the child adjudicated as abused or 
neglected.70  As the petitioner, ACS prosecutes actions brought in Family Court.71 
Once a child is removed, the parent can petition for a hearing which must be 
held within three court days of the application. Once ACS has filed a petition, the 
Family Court is required to hold a preliminary hearing “as soon as practicable” 
to determine whether the child’s interests require protection.72  The court has the 
power to order removal of the child if that is judged necessary to avoid imminent 
danger to the child’s life or health.73 Among other factors, the court must 
consider whether ACS made appropriate and reasonable efforts to prevent or 
eliminate the need for removal.74 The court also determines whether imminent 
risk would be eliminated by a temporary order of protection directing the 
removal of a person from the child’s residence.75 
If ACS determines that there is not enough time to file a petition and hold a 
preliminary hearing, it is authorized to seek, and the Family Court is empowered 
to issue, a preliminary order of removal.76  In deciding whether to issue such an 
order, the court considers available protective services, including the removal of 
 
 67.  Id. at 167.  
 68.  Leidholdt, supra note 58.  
 69.  Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 70.  Id. at 167.  See also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1032(a) (McKinney 2014); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 397 
(2)(b), 424(11) (McKinney 2014).  
 71.  Nicholson, 203 F.Supp. 2d. at 167.  
 72.  Id.; see also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1027(a) (McKinney 2014).  
 73.   NY FAM. CT. ACT § 1027(b)(i) (McKinney 2014).  
 74.  Id.   
 75.  Id.  
 76.  N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1022.  
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offending persons from the residence.77  The court must consider whether the 
agency made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child; if not, the 
court can order that these efforts be made.78  If the court orders removal, then it 
will either send the child to a foster care agency or find a “suitable” person to 
take care of the child other than the respondent parent. 
It would appear that the Family Court Act provides victims of domestic 
violence with adequate safeguards to prevent unnecessary removal of their 
children.  However in reality its protections are often ignored.79  As Judge 
Weinstein noted, “In many other cases, petitions in Family Court allege neglect 
and domestic violence against the mother even when she has herself committed 
no violence and is separated from the batterer, and is caring for her child with no 
evidence of harm to the child.”80 
If ACS decides that there is inadequate time to obtain this expedited 
preliminary order, it may remove a child from her parents without a court 
order.81  If ACS removes a child without a court order it must file a petition 
“forthwith,” which is generally taken to mean within twenty-four hours and no 
more than three business days.82  However, as we will see below, ACS often 
interprets the rules loosely.  If a child is removed prior to a court order (which 
must be issued only following a hearing where the parents were present and had 
the opportunity to be represented by counsel), the parents have the right to 
apply for a court hearing to secure the child’s return.83  This can lead to a long 
and arduous fact-finding stage which places a tremendous burden on families.  
As Nicholas Scoppetta, former Commissioner of ACS, remarked, “Once you are 
in the Family Court, you are in it very often for many months before you can get 
to the substance of the case.”84 
After provisional arrangements for the child have been determined, the 
court proceedings move to the fact-finding stage.  At the fact-finding hearing to 
determine whether a child has been abused or neglected, ACS has the burden of 
proving its case by a preponderance of the evidence.  A finding that a child is 
abused or neglected means that the State will continue its involvement in the 
family’s life for a long time.  The dispositional hearing is the last phase of the 
proceeding.  Courts have great discretion in determining whether to place the 
children in foster care or to return them to the custody of their parents with 
certain specified conditions.85 
 
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Leidholdt, supra note 58. 
 79.  Id.  
 80. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 192 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 81.  Id at 167. See also N.Y. SOC. SEV. LAW § 1024 (McKinney 2014) (providing for the emergency 
removal of children without a court order); N.Y. SOC. SEV. LAW § 417 (detailing the process by which 
children are taken into protective custody); Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 594 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(stating that a child may be taken into protective custody without parental consent).  
 82.   See  N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW  § 1024(b)(iii) (McKinney 2014).  
 83.   N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW  § 1028.  
 84.  Jaime Perrone, Note, Failing to Realize Nicholson’s Vision: How New York’s Child Welfare System 
Continues to Punish Battered Mothers, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 641, 647 (quoting Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 
168).  
 85.  Child Protective Proceedings (Abused or Neglected Children), New York City Family Court,  
http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/family/faqs_abusedchildren.shtml (last accessed Mar. 21, 
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In 2002, at the time of the Nicholson case, the approach of child welfare 
agencies to battered women was embodied in a standing directive that instructed 
caseworkers to resolve “any ambiguity regarding the safety of the child . . . in 
favor of removing the child from harm’s way.”86  In other words, when there is 
doubt about the safety of the child, remove the child immediately.  In addition, 
there was no accountability for punitive practices in domestic violence cases, no 
technical assistance available to help resolve any ambiguities, and an 
overburdened legal staff.87  Therefore, removal (with or without a court order) 
became the effective policy of child welfare agencies.88 
An example of this approach can be seen in ACS’s treatment of Shiqipe 
Berisha, the mother of a two-year old child.  The child’s father suddenly attacked 
her and dragged her across the apartment while she held her son.89  The police 
arrested both Ms. Berisha and her batterer.  The District Attorney declined to 
prosecute her and she was released.  Despite the D.A. decision, ACS took the 
child into custody without a court order.  Two weeks after removal of the child, 
Ms. Berisha went to Family Court in an attempt to get her child back.  The court 
was unable to provide her with an attorney and refused to consider the case 
without one.  Finally, more than a month after removal, the child was ultimately 
returned to his mother, but ACS continued to prosecute the mother for neglect in 
Family Court.90 
C. Effects on Children of Exposure to Domestic Violence 
The presumption that there are traumatic effects on children of exposure to 
domestic violence is based on findings that “[c]hildren of battered women have 
been found to be at increased risk for a broad range of emotional and behavioral 
difficulties, including suicidality, substance abuse, depression, developmental 
delays, education and attention problems, and involvement in violence.”91  
However, there has been a “consistent failure of researchers, including the range 
of advocates who consulted with ACS, to conceptualize the widely documented 
‘over-lap’ between domestic violence and harms to children’s welfare.”92  Studies 
have shown that the psychological impact of being wrenched from the home and 
care of the mother can cause even greater damage.93  Indeed, removing a child 
from his mother may be “more damaging to the child than doing nothing at 
all.”94 
 
2015). 
 86.  Stark, supra note 2, at 693 
 87.  Id. at 693–94.  
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).  
 90.  Id. at 189-90. 
 91.  Bancroft et al.,, supra note 28, at 1. 
 92.  Stark, supra note 2, at 699.  
 93.  Id.  
 94.  Nicholson,  203 F. Supp. 2d at 204; see also MICHAEL S. WALD, S. WALD, J.M. CARLSMITH & P.H. 
LEIDERMAN, PROTECTING ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN 10-11 (1988). (“Attachment theory 
predicts several different ways in which removal from home may be harmful to a child.  In addition 
to the pain of separation, which often is very profound, a lengthy separation from a primary 
caretaker may permanently impair the child’s attachment to that person, even if the separation is not 
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The presumption in favor of removing children from domestic violence 
situations unfairly places the onus on a mother to remove herself and her 
children from an abusive situation.95 Child welfare agencies interact primarily 
with women with the stated objectives of creating better mothers and better 
environments for the children.  Fathers and father-surrogates are essentially 
ignored.  Parenting skills programs have also typically been aimed at mothers: 
“Given its historical tendency to define mothers as its clients, but not fathers, 
once CPS determined to treat exposure to domestic violence as an emergent 
situation requiring removal, the third background factor followed—the 
application of the failure to protect and neglect doctrines to non-offending 
parents.”96 In addition to the systemic and psychological factors, political and 
historical factors put additional pressure on child welfare workers to err on the 
side of over-protecting children at the expense of their mothers. 
At the time of the Nicholson case, the New York City child-welfare system 
was ripe for change.97  Despite a number of previous attempts to reform the 
child-welfare system, there had been no lasting structural impact.  For most of 
the 20th century, the philosophical goals of child welfare had centered on the 
objective of keeping families intact and providing services to help impoverished 
families support their children.98  With the publication of research about the 
“battered child syndrome”99 in 1962, [t]he ‘battered child’ became the subject of 
numerous news articles, and within a decade every state passed laws that 
required medical professionals to report children who showed possible signs of 
mistreatment. The responsibility to look into all allegations of mistreatment soon 
overwhelmed the resources of child-welfare agencies.  They largely cast aside 
their mission of easing child poverty and eventually began investigating the 
dysfunctions surrounding more than two million children a year.  The interests 
of children were often pitted against those of their parents, who were treated as 
potential suspects.”100 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the approach of child welfare agencies was to 
remove children from substance abusing parents and “to swiftly find new 
permanent families for children whose parents were unable or unwilling to 
assume responsibility.”101  This policy eventually became a subject of intense 
dispute between two academics, Elizabeth Bartholet and Martin Guggenheim.  
Professor Bartholet argued that the approach of child welfare agencies failed to 
protect children from abuse and neglect and advocated removing children from 
their biological families and placing them for adoption.  Professor Guggenheim 
responded that future generations would regard the policy of “banishing 
 
permanent.  Perhaps the greatest threat, however, occurs when the child is separated permanently 
from an attachment figure and is either unable to develop a new relationship or is denied the 
opportunity to do so.”). 
 95.  Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 204.  
 96.  Stark, supra note 2, at 703.  
 97.  Interview with Jane Spinak, Professor, Columbia Law School (Aug. 1, 2013).  
 98.  Rachel Aviv, Where is Your Mother?: A Woman’s Fight to Keep Her Child,NEW YORKER, Dec. 2, 
2013, at 52, 55. 
 99.  Id.  
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 56.  
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children from their birth families” as a tragic social experiment.102  He argued 
that “the use of coercive state power to redistribute children from their biological 
parents to others deemed by the state to be superior caregivers should be 
restricted to rare and extreme cases, and resorted to only when less drastic 
measures had failed.”103  The failure of policy-makers to heed his advice is 
evidenced by the dramatic increase in the number of children placed in foster 
care during that time period: the number of children entering foster care rose by 
nearly 250,000 children from 1980 to 2000.104 
In the 1970s and early 1980s, public attention also began to be focused on 
the impact of domestic violence on women, leading to the creation of services to 
protect victims.  There was developing research on the impact on victims, and in 
the 1980s and 1990s, a body of evidence expanded the notion of who counted as a 
victim: research suggested that it was harmful for children to be exposed to 
domestic violence.105  This research led to some child protection agencies 
“defining exposure to domestic violence as a form of child maltreatment.”. . .”106  
Children previously had not had not been included in the domestic violence 
equation as victims. The philosophical divide between advocates for domestic 
violence victims and advocates for children resulted in the development of child 
welfare policies and practices around children’s exposure to domestic violence 
without adequate input from experts in domestic violence. “Following the 
presumption that being ‘exposed’ to domestic violence harms children, CPS 
[ACS] and courts in many states…instituted a policy of charging battered 
mothers with neglect and temporarily removing their children if it was alleged 
that the children witnessed the violence or were otherwise exposed to it.”107 
The language used in these allegations was “engaging in domestic 
violence”.  This language implied that there were two actors engaging in the 
violence, instead of one batterer and one victim, and that both actors made the 
choice to engage in the act.  For example, the language used in the neglect 
petition filed by ACS against Sharlene Tillett, as cited in the Nicholson decision, 
alleged that she “engage[d] in acts of domestic violence in the presence of subject 
child.”108  The facts revealed that she had been choked by her batterer. 
These child welfare policies had devastating consequences for victims of 
domestic violence who were “re-victimized and re-cast as potentially harmful to 
their offspring by the very system designed to protect their children.”109 
D. Influence of Child Abuse Cases 
Against this background, there were several headline-grabbing incidents of 
 
 102.  Id. at 58.  
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Sandra Stukes Chipungu & Tricia B. Bent-Goodley, Meeting the Challenges of Contemporary 
Foster Care, 75, 77-79 (2004).  
 105. Friend, Shlonsky & Lambert, supra note 27, at 690.  
 106. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).  
 107. Stark, supra note 2, at 696-97.  
 108. Nicholson,, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 171. See also, infra Part IV (discussing the Nicholson decision in 
detail). 
 109.  Friend, Shlonsky & Lambert, supra note 27, at 690. 
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child abuse that would reinforce the default view that removing children was the 
appropriate response to situations of domestic abuse. 
In 1995, the story of Elisa Izquierdo made city and national headlines.  Six-
year old Elisa, having suffered a lifetime of abuse, was finally murdered by her 
mother.110  Despite repeated complaints to child welfare authorities, the system 
missed numerous opportunities to intervene with her family and save her life.111  
Elisa became a symbol of a dysfunctional bureaucracy, one that allowed a drug 
addict to retain custody of her daughter despite numerous reports of abuse.112 
The resulting outcry led to an overhaul of New York City’s child welfare system 
and the passage in Albany of Elisa’s Law,113 a measure that loosened the secrecy 
regulations in child-abuse investigations.114 Among other reforms, the law 
required a public accounting of the events leading up to the death of any child in 
New York State who had been reported as abused or neglected.115  An additional 
change was the decision of Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, who had cut funds from 
the city’s child welfare agency early in his tenure, to provide funds to hire two 
hundred new caseworkers, reorganize the children’s agency, and make it directly 
accountable to the Mayor.  He hired Nicholas Scoppetta, who was himself raised 
in foster care, as the Commissioner of the newly-created Administration of 
Children’s Services.116  Commissioner Scoppetta increased the required training 
for caseworkers and mandated refresher courses in “risk assessment.”117 
Nonetheless, one year later, a judicially appointed panel of specialists found 
that ACS employees continued to endanger the lives of children with the same 
errors that led to Elisa’s death.118  The panel found no improvement in the 
quality of investigations of abuse, finding that the city failed to perform even the 
most rudimentary tasks required by the law.119  The events and publicity 
inevitably created a risk-averse approach, on the part of ACS employees, 
towards assessing children and their families. Over the course of one year, the 
number of children removed by the City from their parents increased by almost 
50%:120  “Overwhelmed, panicked workers [were] more likely to make bad, snap 
 
 110.  See Joyce Purnick, Elisa’s Death: A Year Later, Hints of Hope,N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 1996), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/21/nyregion/elisa-s-death-a-year-later-hints-of-hope.html.  
 111.  See Joe Sexton, Mother of Elisa Izquierdo Pleads Guilty to Murder in a Pivotal Child Abuse Case, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/25/nyregion/mother-of-elisa-
izquierdo-pleads-guilty-to-murder-in-a-pivotalchild-abuse-case.html. (“That Elisa was at risk had 
been known for years to child welfare officials, the Family Court, social workers, schoolteachers and 
others.”). 
 112.  Jo Craven McGinty, State Keeps Death Files of Abused Children Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2012, 
at A21.   
 113.  N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(a) (McKinney2014).  
 114.  Id.  
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Purnick, supra note 110.  
 117.  Barbara Stack, Open Justice: Little Girl's Murder Brought New York's Juvenile Court Proceedings 
into the Light, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Sept. 24, 2001), http://old.post-
gazette.com/regionstate/20010924d2courtmainreg2.asp.  
 118.  Rachel L. Swarns, Panel Faults Caseworkers in Child Abuse, N.Y.. TIMES (Aug. 14, 1997), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/14/nyregion/panel-faults-caseworkers-in-child-abuse.html.  
 119.  Id.  
 120.  Nina Bernstein, 2 Deaths Narrow Focus on Child Welfare Agency’s Changes and Limits, N.Y. 
TTIMES, (Nov. 18, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/18/nyregion/2-deaths-narrow-focus-
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decisions in both directions.  So more children [were] needlessly taken from 
homes that [were] safe, or could be made safe with the right services, even as 
other children [were] left in danger.”121 
In 1996, another incident sparked a class action lawsuit on behalf of a class 
represented by Marisol, a child who had been confined to a closet for several 
months, deprived of sustenance and both physically and sexually abused.122  
Marisol’s aunt and foster mother had both filed reports of abuse with ACS with 
no response from the agency.123 
Representatives of eleven children who had suffered abuse and neglect 
because of the failures of ACS filed a civil rights action for violation of the 
children’s rights under the state child welfare laws, in Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. 
Giulian124  Marisol had originally been placed in foster care while her mother was 
incarcerated on drug charges.  However, in 1994 ACS restored Marisol to her 
mother’s care, despite reports that she had continued to abuse Marisol even 
during visits while she was in foster care.  The Marisol case was settled in 1999 
with the establishment of an advisory panel of child welfare experts that would 
oversee ACS’s reform efforts.125  In 2003, a report published by attorneys at 
Children’s Rights entitled “Continuing Danger: A Report on Child Fatalities in 
New York City” concluded that there was a recurrent pattern of caseworker and 
agency mistakes:126 “Many critics say the emphasis on removing children from 
their home to protect them –’When in doubt, take them out’ caseworkers say—
has gone too far, hurting children who, with help, would be safer with their own 
parents than in foster care.”127 
Against this background, there have been continuing incidents of parental 
violence towards children, reinforcing the approach of removing children to 
prevent abuse.  In 2008, seven-year-old Nixzmary Brown was tortured, beaten 
and killed by her stepfather, César Rodriguez.128  Her mother, Nixzaliz Santiago, 
ignored Rodriguez as he slammed Brown’s head into a bathtub and doused her 
with cold water. Both Santiago and Rodriguez were charged with second-degree 
murder and child endangerment. Rodriguez was convicted on a verdict of first-
degree manslaughter and other charges, and was sentenced to 29 years in prison. 
Santiago was convicted of manslaughter, assault and other charges.129 
Evidence of previous abuse inflicted on Nixzmary came to light, and the 
news coverage of her murder case later drew public attention.  Again, it was 
 
on-child-welfare-agency-s-changes-and-limits.html. 
 121.  Id. (quoting Richard Wexler, director of the National Coalition for Child Protection Reform).  
 122.  Marisol A. ex rel Forbes v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  
 123.  Id.  
 124.  126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 125.  Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 185 F.R.D. 152 (S.D.N.Y.1999), aff'd 218 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 
2000).  
 126. Continuing Danger: A Report on Child Fatalities in New York City, 
CHILDRENSRIGHTS.ORG, http://web.archive.org/web/20101225073632/http://www.children 
rights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/continuing_danger_february_2003.pdf. 
 127.  Nina Bernstein, Pattern Cited in Missed Signs of Child Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/22/nyregion/pattern-cited-in-missed-signs-of-child-abuse.html.  
 128.  Kareem Fahim, Mother Gets 43 Years in Death of Child, 7, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/13/nyregion/13nixzmary.html?_r=0.  
 129.  Id.  
Beller_Spring 2015 (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  7:46 PM 
 WHEN IN DOUBT, TAKE THEM OUT 221 
found that ACS had received previous complaints about Brown’s family, and 
ultimately disciplined six employees who were working on the investigation.130  
In March, 2006, a City panel created by Mayor Michael Bloomberg in response to 
Brown’s death, advocated changes in the system.131 “Nixzmary’s Law” was 
passed in 2009, making life without parole the maximum sentence for killing a 
child in an “especially cruel and wanton manor.”132 
In 2010, in another incident of ACS failure, Marchella Pierce was found 
dead, after having been drugged, beaten and tied to a bed by her mother and 
grandmother.133  The family was already under the supervision of ACS when the 
events unfolded,  “[a]nd when she came under the watch of the city’s 
Administration for Children’s Services, an agency remade a number of times 
after child deaths, her well-being fell to caseworkers who, prosecutors say, 
essentially ignored the family.”134  Two former employees of the agency pleaded 
guilty to misdemeanor charges in December 2013.135 
These repeated incidents of abuse in families under the supervision of ACS 
heighten the pressure on ACS workers when they encounter a situation of 
domestic violence.  It is understandable and appropriate that ACS workers view 
removal of children as a possible response if they perceive potential harm to the 
child.  However, the nuanced approach required in a situation of domestic 
violence involves evaluating the extent to which the abuse is directed only 
against the mother, whether the abuse is likely to happen again, and whether 
removing a child is really the optimal solution.  The headline-grabbing errors in 
judgment increase the perceived dangers of leaving a child in a dangerous 
situation.  However, without an adequate understanding of the dynamics of 
domestic violence and experience in dealing with those types of situations, it is 
difficult to accurately assess the actual risk to a child. For example, it is important 
to be able to distinguish between a one-time violent event, and a continued 
pattern of domestic violence.  It is essential to recognize a situation of abuse 
where intervention could prevent future incidents.  The impact of removal on a 
child’s psychological and emotional well-being must be measured against the 
potential harm resulting from viewing an incident of domestic violence.136  This 
 
 130.  Press Release, N.Y.C. Administration for Children’s Services, ACS Disciplines Staff in 
Brooklyn Fatality, Reorganizes Administration to Improve Child Protection Services, and Initiates 
DOI Investigation(Jan. 18, 2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/html/pr_archives 
/pr06_01_18.shtml.   
 131.  Sewell Chan, City to Adopt Changes in Handling of Abuse Cases, N.Y. TIMES (March 30, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/30/nyregion/30abuse.html. 
 132.  Glenn Blain, Gov. Paterson signs Nixzmary's Law, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 9, 2009), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/gov-paterson-signs-nixzmary-law-article-
1.381561#ixzz30UbMTG00.  
 133.  N.R. Kleinfield & Mosi Secret, A Bleak Life, Cut Short at 4, Harrowing from the Start, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/09/nyregion/short-bleak-life-of-
marchella-pierce-emaciated-4-year-old.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Al Baker, State Official Appointed by de Blasio as Leader of Child Welfare Agency, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/23/nyregion/de-blasio-picks-state-social-
services-official-to-lead-city-childrens-agency.html.  
 136.  See Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“For those children who 
are in homes where there is domestic violence, disruption of that bond can be even more traumatic 
than situations where there is no domestic violence.  Dr. Stark asserted that if a child is placed in 
Beller_Spring 2015 (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  7:46 PM 
222 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 22:205 2015 
kind of balanced reflection is difficult to do in an atmosphere of fear, time 
pressure and restricted resources. 
The history of child abuse in New York and the recurrent errors of 
judgment on the part of ACS, are likely to provide a fearful and risk-averse 
environment for those involved in protection of children.  This fear can outweigh 
a balanced assessment for child protective workers who “recognize that if they 
recommend returning a child to a deadly home ‘it will be a career ender…It will 
sully their reputations forever.’ They may choose a knowable tragedy, the 
separation of a parent and child, in order to prevent an unknowable one.”137  The 
key is having the judgment to distinguish between a home that presents dangers 
for a child and a home where the mother is the victim of an abuser but a suitable 
mother for the child. 
III. THE ABUSIVE PRACTICES UNCOVERED BY NICHOLSON 
“ACS unnecessarily routinely prosecutes mothers for neglect and removes their 
children where the mothers have been the victims of significant domestic 
violence, and where the mothers themselves have done nothing wrong.”138 
A. Nicholson v. Williams 
The case of Nicholson v. Williams139 illustrates the ways in which ACS 
routinely removed children from mothers who were victims of abuse, in 
violation of the mothers’ and children’s substantive and procedural due process 
rights.  The case began in 2000, when Sharwline Nicholson filed a complaint 
against ACS and New York City alleging that ACS had removed her children 
simply because she had been the victim of domestic assault, and that this 
removal was unwarranted and violated her and her children’s constitutional 
rights.140  A few months later, Ekaete Udoh and Sharlene Tillett filed similar 
complaints.141  These three women were the lead plaintiffs of a class action 
lawsuit involving all mothers and children similarly situated.  Seventeen 
battered mothers provided testimony.142  The court certified class action, and 
granted a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs, holding that “ACS’s conduct 
substantially infringed on fundamental liberty interests of mothers and children 
without advancing compelling or substantial state interest.”143  Judge Weinstein 
strongly criticized ACS’s “pitiless double abuse” of battered mothers.144 
The injunction resulted from a 24-day trial, during which the court heard 
 
foster care as a result of domestic violence in the home, then he or she may view such removal as a 
‘traumatic act of punishment….’”)  
 137.  Aviv, supra note 98, at 54.  
 138.  Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d. at 228. 
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Support Battered Mothers And Their Children, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 725, 731 (2004). 
 141.  Id.  
 142.  Id.  
 143.  Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d. at 266.  
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testimony regarding the policies and practices of ACS, domestic violence and 
child welfare, and the effects of domestic violence and removal from the home on 
children.145 The opinion included an account of the experiences of ten different 
women who had similar interactions with ACS. 
The three lead plaintiffs’ stories illustrate how the “ACS system results in 
the forcible and unjustified separation of abused mothers and their children.”146 
1.  Sharwline Nicholson 
In 1999 Sharwline Nicholson was a single working mother of two young 
children.147  She had an eight-year-old son from a previous relationship and a 
three-year-old daughter from her relationship with Claude Barnett.  Mr. Barnett 
lived in South Carolina and made monthly visits to Brooklyn to visit the 
family.148  On one of his visits, Ms. Nicholson told him she wanted to end their 
relationship and Mr. Barnett assaulted her. He had never previously acted 
violently towards her.  This was an isolated attack, provoked by his rage that she 
was leaving him. 
The assault had occurred during the day. Ms. Nicholson’s son was at school 
and her daughter was in her crib sleeping in the next room. When Mr. Barnett 
left, Ms. Nicholson called 911, and arranged for a neighbor to care for her 
children while she went to the hospital. In the emergency room she discovered 
that she had suffered a broken arm, fractured ribs and head injuries. 
Three police officers came to see her in the hospital. When she found out 
that she would have to stay in the hospital overnight, she gave them the names 
of two family members who could care for her children.  Instead of bringing the 
children to these relatives, however, representatives of ACS removed Ms. 
Nicholson’s children from the neighbor’s home, and brought them to a 
temporary residence.  The following day an ACS worker refused to tell Ms. 
Nicholson where her children were, and told her that if she wanted to see her 
children again she had to appear in court the next week. Despite requests from 
Ms. Nicholson to allow her children to stay with relatives, they were eventually 
placed in foster care with strangers.149 
An ACS caseworker was assigned to the Nicholson case.  In his deposition 
at trial, he conceded that it is common in domestic violence cases for ACS to wait 
a few days before going to court after removing a child (which is not permissible 
according to §1026150), because as the mother gets increasingly desperate to get 
her children back, she will agree to any and all of the conditions required by ACS 
for the children’s return without the matter going to court.151  The caseworker 
testified that he did not believe that Ms. Nicholson was actually neglectful but 
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 146.  Id. at 168.  
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 148.  Id. at 168-69.  
 149.  Id.  at 170. 
 150.  Id. at 168 (“If the ACS removes a child without a court order, it file[s] a petition “forthwith,” 
which is generally taken to mean within twenty-four hours and no more than three business days.”)  
 151.  Id. at 170.  
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hoped that she would be forced to cooperate to protect herself and her children.152  
He did not file a petition with the Family Court until three business days after 
the children were placed in foster care.153  In his testimony, he tried to justify his 
approach by stating that he believed it would not be safe for Ms. Nicholson and 
her children to return to the residence and that she had never obtained an order 
of protection.154  If he had properly investigated the family situation, he would 
have discovered that Mr. Barnett lived in South Carolina, did not have a key to 
the apartment, and that Ms. Nicholson had tried to obtain an order of protection 
that had been denied because Mr. Barnett lived out of state. 
Judge Weinstein concluded, “The allegations of neglect on the part of 
Nicholson resulting from [the case manager’s] failure to properly investigate the 
situation evince either blatant bias against victims of domestic abuse or 
inexcusable ignorance of what abuse victims face.”155  The allegations implied 
that both Ms. Nicholson and Mr. Barnett engaged in acts of domestic violence in 
the presence of the children, when the facts clearly showed that Ms. Nicholson 
was merely the victim.  In addition, ACS claimed that Ms. Nicholson failed to 
cooperate with services offered by ACS, when in reality none were offered. 
On February 4, 1999, the Family Court ordered that Ms. Nicholson’s 
children be returned to her, on the condition that she and the children stay at her 
cousin’s home.  Despite the court’s ruling, there was a 14-day delay before Ms. 
Nicholson’s children were returned to her because ACS claimed that they were 
concerned that there were not enough beds at the cousin’s home. Although 
adequate housing is always a concern for managers evaluating family 
circumstances, this appears to have been a fabricated reason for keeping the 
children away from Ms. Nicholson.  She was allowed to see the children only 
once during this time period and only under supervised visitation at an ACS 
foster agency.  On February 18, 21 days after the removal and 14 days after the 
Family Court had paroled Ms. Nicholson’s children to her, ACS returned her 
children to her.156 
Following the return of Ms. Nicholson’s children, ACS claimed to have 
difficulty visiting with her and her children and filed a warrant application.  
Fearing that ACS would take her children again, Ms. Nicholson sent them 
temporarily to Jamaica to live with her father.  On April 7, Ms. Nicholson was 
handcuffed and arrested at a local post office and brought into Family Court.  She 
explained that her children were in Jamaica and was ordered to return to court 
with them on April 24.  She complied and the court permitted her to continue to 
live in her own apartment with her children, as long as she cooperated with 
supervision and the services offered by ACS.  After Ms. Nicholson complied with 
these conditions, ACS eventually dropped the petition against her in August.  
Nevertheless, she continued to be listed on ACS records as a neglectful parent.157 
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2.  Ekaete Udoh158 
Ekaete Udoh was born and raised in Nigeria, and, following an arranged 
marriage, came to the U.S. with her husband. She lived in Kentucky from 1977 to 
1982.  During that time, Ms. Udoh had five daughters and was routinely beaten 
by her husband.  She testified that she called the police “many” times to report 
the abuse, but the police never arrested her husband.159 
The family moved to New York in 1984, and the beatings continued.  In 
1985, Ms. Udoh called the police. The police came, but did not arrest Mr. Udoh 
and did nothing to assist Ms. Udoh or the children.160  An ACS investigation in 
1996 concluded that Mr. Udoh claimed that “under his Nigerian cultural 
upbringing, he was allowed to engage in corporal punishment as a means of 
controlling the ‘so-called unruly behavior of his children, and that this even 
extend[ed] to the disciplining of his wife’s behavior.’”161  Despite this report, ACS 
did not help Ms. Udoh to leave or attempt to remove Mr. Udoh from the house 
or limit his contact with his family. 
In 1999, Mr. Udoh physically assaulted one of his daughters.  Ms. Udoh sent 
her daughter to school, but came to pick her up to take her to the doctor.  When 
school officials discovered the cause of the injury, they reported the incident to 
ACS.162 
On May 6, a caseworker came to interview the family and told Mr. Udoh 
that she would call the police if he continued to reside in the home.  She brought 
Ms. Udoh and the children to the ACS office to file a complaint.  When they 
returned to the home, Mr. Udoh had packed his clothes, left the house, and never 
came to the home again, returning to Nigeria the following year.  While at the 
ACS offices, the caseworker told Ms. Udoh to appear in Family Court the 
following day.  Although ACS testified that they did not consider the children to 
be in imminent danger if they remained with the mother, ACS filed a neglect 
petition against her the following day on the basis that she had “engaged” in 
domestic violence.163  The caseworker testified that the basis for the neglect 
petition was the fear that no one would be home when the children (aged 12, 13, 
16, and 17) returned home after school because the parents would be in Family 
Court.  On May 7, the caseworker removed the children from school while the 
mother was at work.  The petition filed by ACS with the court had only blank 
spaces where answers were required for why insufficient time was available to 
obtain a court order prior to removal and why removal of the children was 
necessary.164 
On May 20, after an investigation, the Family Court ordered the children 
returned to the mother.  Yet it took eight days for ACS to notify the foster care 
agency to return them.  The delay prompted Legal Aid to file an application 
seeking immediate release of the children from ACS custody.  Ironically, in this 
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application the children’s attorney noted that the delay was harming the children 
because, among other reasons, the foster mother refused to give the children 
house keys so they were often locked out of their foster home.165 
3.  Sharlene Tillett166 
In 1995, Ms. Tillett moved from Belize to New York with her son to live with 
her husband.167  Shortly thereafter, she and her husband separated. Ms. Tillett 
began a relationship with a man who grew increasingly jealous of her previous 
husband and became physically abusive.  In August 1999, she entered the 
hospital to give birth to her second child, Uganda, and reported to the staff that 
there was a history of domestic violence against her by the father.  After the birth 
of her child, the father drove her home but did not enter the apartment.  The 
hospital made a report to SCR, and a caseworker from ACS visited Ms. Tillett at 
her apartment.  The caseworker found satisfactory conditions and did not 
remove the child.168 
The following day ACS removed Uganda without a court order based on 
their view that Uganda was in “imminent danger”169 because Ms. Tillett and the 
baby were being supported by the batterer, even though Ms. Tillett reported that 
the batterer had moved out and that she expected family support.  Ms. Tillett 
was breastfeeding the baby when she was removed.  The following day ACS 
filed a neglect petition against Ms. Tillett and the father, alleging that they 
engaged in domestic violence in the presence of the child.170  This was clearly 
fictitious since Uganda was not even born when Ms. Tillett reported the instances 
of abuse. On September 3, the Family Court remanded Uganda to ACS with 
privilege to parole, which meant that ACS could return Uganda to her mother if 
they determined that the residence was safe.171 
Ms. Tillett had moved into a new residence in her own name, obtained 
employment and supported herself, and began classes in domestic violence and 
parenting.  Nevertheless, ACS still refused to return Uganda to her mother 
because they thought Ms. Tillett should undergo a psychological evaluation.  
There had been no mention in the court order of such requirement.  Ms. Tillett 
objected to the psychological evaluation, and it was not until two months after 
the separation, on October 20, that Uganda was ultimately returned to her 
mother.172 
 4.  The Decision 
“It desecrates fundamental precepts of justice to blame a crime on the victim.”173 
After a twenty-four day trial, including forty-four witnesses and two 
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hundred and twelve documents, Judge Weinstein granted a preliminary 
injunction requiring ACS to implement certain conditions.174  Judge Weinstein 
found that ACS policies and procedures violated a number of constitutional 
rights of battered mothers and their children.  Judge Weinstein concluded that in 
many other cases, ACS filed petitions in Family Court alleging “neglect and 
domestic violence against the mother even when she has herself committed no 
violence and is separated from the batterer, and is caring for her child with no 
evidence of harm to the child.”175 
Judge Weinstein reached the following conclusions: ACS regularly claimed 
neglect against battered mothers; they rarely held abusers accountable; they 
failed to offer adequate services to mothers before prosecuting them or removing 
their children; they regularly separated battered mothers and children 
unnecessarily; they failed to adequately train employees regarding domestic 
violence; and their mission statement and written policies provided insufficient 
and inappropriate guidance to employees.176  The City’s own expert testified that 
the “documents ACS has produced related to assessing domestic violence do not 
earn a ‘passing grade.’”177 
Judge Weinstein held that there was an agency-wide policy within ACS of 
removing children from their mothers without evidence of her neglect and 
without seeking prior judicial approval, and that the policy of removing children 
solely because the mother had been a victim of domestic violence violated both 
the mothers’ and the children’s substantive and procedural due process rights 
and infringed on the mothers’ fundamental liberty interests in family privacy.178 
Judge Weinstein found, “[t]he evidence reveals widespread and unnecessary 
cruelty by agencies of the City of New York towards mothers abused by their 
consorts, through forced unnecessary separation of the mothers from their 
children, on the excuse that this sundering is necessary to protect the 
children.”179  The court found that unnecessary removals actually did more to 
harm than to help the children involved and that there was neither a compelling 
nor a substantial state interest to justify the policy.180  Judge Weinstein held that 
ACS routinely and improperly prosecuted mothers for neglecting their children 
when they have done nothing but suffer abuse at the hands of a partner.181  He 
stated that the government has “a responsibility to protect a victim of domestic 
violence from her partner, a responsibility not met by punishing her through 
forcible separation from her children.”182 
Judge Weinstein also acknowledged that ACS has the primary 
responsibility and duty to protect the children.183  Setting aside the fear that the 
child could itself be abused, arguments were also advanced that suggested that 
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merely witnessing domestic violence could lead to long-term psychological 
damage.184  Expert testimony showed that children exposed to domestic violence 
can display short-term effects of post-traumatic stress disorder, behavioral 
problems, depression, and other psychological problems.185  It is clear that in the 
best circumstances, it is preferable for a child to never be a witness to domestic 
violence.  However the issue here is whether the effects of separation of children 
from their mothers and placement in foster care can be significant enough to 
measure against the effects of witnessing domestic abuse.  Evidence showed that 
removal can have very serious negative effects on children.186  In addition, the 
foster care system itself is dangerous. Some scholars assert that children are 
actually more likely to be abused in foster care than in the general population:187 
“[T]aking a child whose greatest fear is separation from his or her mother and in 
the name of ‘protecting’ that child [by] forcing on them, what is in effect, their 
worst nightmare. . .is tantamount to pouring salt on an open wound.”188 
The court ultimately determined that New York City could no longer 
“penalize a mother, not otherwise unfit, who is battered by her partner, by 
separating her from her children, nor may children be separated from the 
mother, in effect, visiting upon them the sins of their mother’s batterer189“Judge 
Weinstein concluded that the best way to protect children in situations of 
domestic violence is to provide services and protection to the mothers, the actual 
victims.  The court concluded that “The consistent policy applied by ACS is to 
remove children of abused mothers in violation of their procedural and 
substantive due process rights solely because the mother has been abused. No 
legislatively appropriate policy, no compelling state interest, justifies these 
removals.”190 
The court required ACS to end the practice of charging domestic violence 
victims with neglect and to end removal of children without court orders.  The 
court found that ACS caseworkers and managers lacked adequate training about 
domestic violence and that they routinely charged mothers with neglect and 
removed their children when the mothers had engaged in no violence 
themselves, but had been victims.191 The court held that ACS did not conduct 
adequate investigation of the facts before removing children and failed to look at 
other alternatives to removal.192 
Judge Weinstein also found that counsel representing abused mothers in 
court were incompetent and did not properly investigate matters or consult with 
their clients.193  He called the system worse than ineffective, as it actually resulted 
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in the delay of hearings and longer separation of mothers and children.  The 
result is a “practice and policy by the State and City of New York violating the 
substantive and procedural constitutional rights of many abused mothers and 
their children.”194 
The court concluded that ACS’s practices and policies violated both the 
substantive and due process rights of mothers and children not to be separated 
by the government unless the parent is unfit to care for the child.195 In January 
2002, the court granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the City “may 
not penalize a mother, not otherwise unfit, who is battered by her partner, by 
separating her from her children, nor may children be separated from the 
mother, in effect visiting upon them the sins of their mother’s batterer.”196 
B. Nicholson v. Scoppetta197 
The City of New York appealed the decision. In 2003, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction but, 
before reaching the constitutional issues in the case, certified three questions to 
the New York State Court of Appeals.198 
The first question was whether the definition of a “neglected child” under 
Family Court Act § 1012 allowed a court to find a parent responsible for neglect 
based on evidence of only two facts: that the parent has been a victim of domestic 
violence, and that the child was exposed to that violence.199 The “more” that is 
required of the petitioner is a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
“(1) the child’s physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is 
in imminent danger of becoming impaired, and (2) the actual or threatened 
impairment is clearly attributable to the mother’s failure to exercise a minimum 
degree of care toward the child.”200  Only when both elements are satisfied can 
the child be considered “neglected”; when the only facts are that the mother was 
abused and the child witnessed the abuse, the requirements have not been met. 
The New York Court of Appeals held that a domestic violence victim could 
be defined per se as neglectful, but only due to her failure to exercise a minimum 
degree of care, not because she was a victim of domestic violence or because her 
children were exposed to it.201  The mother could be charged with neglect only if 
a “preponderance of the evidence establishes that the children were actually or 
imminently harmed by reason of her failure to exercise even minimal care in 
providing them with proper oversight.”202  The standard for evaluating whether 
a battered mother has acted reasonably under the circumstances is for the courts 
to consider the “risks attendant to leaving, if the batterer has threatened to kill 
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her…risks attendant to staying and suffering continued abuse, risks attendant to 
seeking assistance through government channels, potentially increasing the 
danger to herself and her children, risks attendant to criminal prosecution 
against the abuser; and risks attendant to relocation.”203  A battered mother could 
now be charged with neglect, but not because she was a victim of domestic 
violence or because her children witnessed the abuse, but “rather because a 
preponderance of the evidence establishes that the children were actually or 
imminently harmed by reason of her failure to exercise even minimal care in 
providing them with proper oversight.”204 
The second question certified to the New York State Court of Appeals was 
whether the damage to the child resulting from witnessing domestic violence 
could be considered a danger or risk to the child’s life or health.205  The court 
emphasized that the legislature had clearly expressed its emphasis on preventive 
services to maintain family relationships rather than removing children as a 
response to problems within the family.  The court recognized that two 
fundamental principles were in conflict: the objective of keeping families 
together and the understanding that the overriding concern is the health and 
safety of the child.206  The court found that there could be no blanket 
presumption in favor of removal because not every child is harmed by exposure 
to domestic violence and removal may do more harm than good: “A fortiori, 
exposure of a child to violence is not presumptively ground for removal, and in 
many instances removal may do more harm to the child than good.”207 
The final question certified to the court was whether a child protective 
agency must offer evidence more than merely witnessing abuse to justify 
removal of a child.208  The court strongly confirmed that there was no support for 
the presumption that if a child has witnessed domestic violence the child has 
been harmed and removal is appropriate.209  They concluded that particularized 
evidence must exist to justify a court order to remove a child, including evidence 
of efforts made to prevent the need for removal.210 
This decision had a dramatic impact on ACS practices.  For several years 
after the decision, the removal of children declined dramatically.  The number of 
instances where a mother was cited for neglect because of domestic violence also 
sharply declined.211  ACS revised its program and instructions about domestic 
violence to reflect the decision and made expertise on domestic violence 
available to staff.212 
The two Nicholson cases have come to represent the way the courts interpret 
the standard for neglect.  The question remains, however, as to whether the 
institutional biases inherent in the child protective field prevent effective 
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implementation of the holdings of the Court of Appeals.  Has the influence of the 
Nicholson decision continued to permeate ACS practices, or is there still a 
residual refusal to consider all of the factors involved in situations of domestic 
violence to enable fair evaluations of whether removal is appropriate?  The 
number of children placed in foster care has declined in the ten years since the 
decision.  However, it is unclear whether ACS has continued to follow the policy 
requirements of Nicholson or whether “the peculiar biases to which child 
protection is predisposed by its mission, programmatic structure and peculiar 
role in our society allow and may even compel even its most progressive 
personnel to engage in morally and constitutionally indefensible practices with 
respect to mothers in general?”213  In the next section, I review several recent 
cases that illustrate the continued victimization of mothers who have 
experienced domestic violence and conclude that further efforts need to be made 
to change ACS policies. 
IV. POST-NICHOLSON: PROMISE UNFULFILLED 
“Despite current plans for reform, this situation is likely to persist unless and 
until ACS broadens its mission to include the safety of all victimized household 
members, shifts the emphasis in safety planning from placement to support and 
preservation, and reflects this broadened mission by fully incorporating 
domestic violence expertise into line authority to which field and supervisory 
staff are accountable.”214 
In light of the changes in ACS stated policies and practices, one can question 
why there continue to be cases where victims are improperly treated by ACS 
employees. I have selected several cases, one published and two based on 
interviews with attorneys at the Brooklyn Defenders Office,215 to illustrate the 
difficulty of changing established patterns of behavior.  I do not intend these 
cases to be a comprehensive review of all instances of removal, nor do I mean to 
imply that ACS employees have not introduced some modification of their 
practices since the Nicholson decisions.  These cases illustrate instances where 
Nicholson has not had the desired impact on treatment of victims and are 
evidence that progress must still be made. 
A. In re David G.216 
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In June 2010, New York City Children’s Services (a division of ACS; 
hereinafter “NYCCS”) filed neglect proceedings in Family Court against the G. 
family based on allegations that the father had abused the mother in the presence 
of the three children and that neither parent was ensuring the children’s regular 
school attendance.217  Once the petition was filed, the court permitted removal of 
the children, placed them with the grandmother and entered a temporary order 
of protection against the father.218  Two months later, the mother requested a 
hearing for return of her son, David (the two other children remained with 
relatives in Pennsylvania), which was granted on several conditions, including 
that she enter a domestic violence shelter, attend therapy and enforce the order 
of protection against the father.  The mother complied with the court order and 
moved to a shelter, but the father violated the order of protection and followed 
her there.  She was afraid for her well-being, and left the shelter without 
informing NYCCS.  She then missed one therapy session during the following 
week.  NYCCS made no efforts to find her.219 
Although the mother and her son had been repeatedly displaced and forced 
to relocate as a result of the father’s abuse, NYCCS showed no indication of 
understanding the circumstances or the holdings of Nicholson.  They took no 
action against the abuser, and instead removed David from his mother’s care and 
placed him in foster care.220  A caseworker testified that the mother’s error “cast 
doubt on her credibility and demonstrated that she could not be trusted to obey 
court orders.”221  NYCCS argued that David was at risk because the mother was 
likely to return to the father, but offered no concrete evidence to support this 
allegation.222  NYCCS also removed the children from their relatives in 
Pennsylvania and placed them in foster care in New York.  In September 2010, 
the mother requested a hearing for all three children.  At the hearing, the NYCCS 
caseworker testified that the removal of all three children was necessary due to 
the possibility that the mother would return to the father.  No evidence was 
presented that indicated that the mother was considering returning to the father 
or had even spoken to him.223  The agency described their concern that the 
mother had failed to keep the agency apprised of her whereabouts and had 
missed one therapy session.224  According to the NYCCS worker, “these acts of 
non-compliance established that the mother could not always be trusted to 
comply with court orders and raised doubts about the reliability of her 
statements, including her assertion that she and the father were no longer 
together.”225 
The court ultimately held that both the emergency removal and continued 
removal of the children from their mother’s care were unnecessary.226  Quoting 
 
217.  Id. at 894; see also Perrone, supra note 84, at 641.   
218.  In re David G., 909 N.Y.S.2d. at 894.  
219.  Id. at 895.  
220.  Id.   
221.  Perrone supra note 84, at 643.  
222.  In re David G., 909 N.Y.S.2d. at 896.  
223.  Id.  
224.  Id.  
225.  Id.  
226.  Id.at 898. 
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extensively from Nicholson v. Scoppetta, it noted that “the public policy in this 
State is to keep families together whenever possible [and to] spare children the 
trauma of removal and placement in foster care.”227  The court held that NYCCS 
had not met its burden of proof and had contravened the conclusions of 
Nicholson. The court stated that NYCCS relied on exactly the same assumptions 
that the Court of Appeals had clearly rejected as an acceptable rationale for 
removals.  The removal of David was based on “assumptions, guesswork and 
unsupported predictions of future behavior.”228 
The court emphasized that the legislature never intended to have a 
presumption favoring removal in the Family Court Act.  On the contrary, the 
policy objective was to keep families together whenever possible: “[W]here one 
parent is abusive but the child may safely reside at home with the other parent, 
the abuser should be removed.”229 
B.   In Re Joy230 
Sharon D. was a twenty-five-year old African American unmarried woman, 
living in Brooklyn.  She was raised in Virginia and had attended high school and 
two years of college before coming to New York.  She had met Michael in 2003 
and had a relationship with him for four years before having her first child, 
Melody.  Michael began to be physically abusive, and Sharon moved to a 
domestic violence shelter.  Michael was subsequently incarcerated for other 
offenses, and Sharon returned to her neighborhood and lived with her brother in 
public housing receiving public assistance. 
Sharon met Carter in 2011 in her neighborhood.  In 2012, she and Melody 
moved in with Carter because Sharon’s brother was smoking marijuana in the 
home and she did not want Melody exposed to it.  Carter had been in and out of 
jail for drug convictions, and had eight arrests, including two felonies and five 
misdemeanors, but was working full-time. Sharon and Carter were together for 
one year before her second child, Joy, was born. 
In April 2012, when Sharon was eight months pregnant with Joy, she began 
to feel sad and depressed about her ability to handle another child. She sought 
help at Brookdale hospital and was assessed and released with a diagnosis of 
depression and a recommendation for outpatient services.  According to hospital 
records, she was not in need of medication or hospitalization.231 Joy was born in 
May 2012.  Although Carter had been physically abusive in the past, he was 
supportive once the baby was born and contributed to the infant’s needs until he 
was laid off from his job. After he was unemployed, he began to be abusive to 
Sharon, and she attempted to end their relationship.  In retaliation, Carter called 
the child abuse hotline, accusing her of inadequate guardianship and lack of 
providing adequate medical care, based on the allegation that she refused to take 
Joy to the doctor. The hotline call triggered an ACS investigation.  An ACS 
 
227.  Id. at 897 (quoting Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E. 2d. 840, 852 (N.Y. 2004)). 
228.  Id. 
229.  Id. at 897 (quoting Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 379 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)). 
230.  Interview with Megan Brown, Staff Attorney, Brooklyn Defender Services (unpublished 
documents on file with Brooklyn Defender Services).  
231.  Id.  
Beller_Spring 2015 (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  7:46 PM 
234 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 22:205 2015 
investigator came to Sharon’s home and advised her to take Joy to the doctor.  
This investigator reported that there were no marks or bruises on Joy and there 
was food in the home.  The investigator did have some concerns which she 
shared with Sharon based on the conditions of her public housing, the presence 
of a pit bull, possible marijuana use, the claim that she suffered from depression, 
and her failure to ensure that Joy was fully immunized or to prevent a severe 
diaper rash.  Nevertheless, the investigator found both children happy and 
generally healthy, with no marks or bruises on either child.  Both children 
appeared to be well cared for.  Melody had a good school attendance record 
(which is typically a red flag in child protective situations) and was reported to 
be a bright child.232 
Four days later, ACS workers visited again, and at this time the home was 
reported to be cleaner than it had been and Sharon had taken Joy to the doctor.  
Sharon had also clearly attempted to remedy the concerns expressed by the 
investigator: she had contacted the housing authority to arrange for carbon 
monoxide and smoke detectors to be installed in the home, and had attempted to 
arrange for further repairs.  Over the course of the next few weeks, ACS made 
several home visits to Sharon.  Sharon was responsive to their requests and 
complied with their suggestions.  They asked her to give away her dog, and she 
did.  She agreed to engage with family protective services, and thereafter was 
visited once a week by a worker who testified that each time the children were 
observed to be well, with no marks or bruises. There was plenty of food in the 
home, the bedrooms were neat and clean and Joy was on target with her 
developmental milestones.  Sharon was communicative with the ACS worker 
and returned his phone calls and stayed in touch.  On December 11, he made 
another visit; both children were happy and healthy and well cared for and 
Carter was no longer living in the home.  On December 20, he visited again, and 
Sharon informed him that she was leaving for Virginia for the holidays. She 
called him several times to keep him updated while she was away. 
On January 11, the worker began to close the case.  He observed that the 
children were happy and healthy.  On January 16, he wrote a report stating that 
the family was stable and that there were no safety concerns regarding welfare of 
the children. He noted that Sharon had demonstrated throughout the 
intervention that “she [had] the ability to provide care, medical care and 
supervision for her two daughters” and that she put the children’s needs ahead 
of her own.233 
On January 22, 2013, Carter unexpectedly came into the home and assaulted 
Sharon, slamming her shoulder into a large television. He became enraged and 
left the room. When he returned, he had a knife in his hand.  He tried to stab her 
and threatened to kill her, all in the presence of Joy.  Following the assault, 
Sharon called the police and was taken to the hospital to have her injuries 
treated.  She obtained an Order of Protection on January 25. However, the 
previous day, ACS had convened a Child Safety Conference about the family.  
Despite the fact that she had just been assaulted and had cooperated fully with 
ACS during the prior three months, she was abruptly informed at this conference 
 
232.  Id.  
233.  Id.  
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that ACS would be filing a neglect petition against her.  When she reacted in 
despair and anger and stormed out of the conference, ACS decided to remove 
Joy from her home. 
The only aspect of the situation that changed between January 15, when 
ACS was closing the case, and the removal of Joy on January 24, was that Sharon 
was assaulted by Carter on January 22, and that she became distraught and 
abruptly left the conference after learning that ACS would be charging her with 
neglect. ACS testimony reflects that the only reason ACS decided to remove Joy 
was because of the statements Sharon made when she left the child safety 
conference, which were clearly outbursts made in frustration and out of fear that 
her children would be taken away.234  They wanted to penalize Sharon for her 
behavior, rather than support her as a victim.  Prior to being removed from 
Sharon, Joy had been in her mother’s care for her entire life.  Once she was 
removed, she was placed in foster care and her contact with her mother was 
limited to supervised visits. 
When ACS filed a neglect petition against Sharon on January 24, she was 
not present in court and was not represented by counsel. The court granted 
removal of Joy and ACS removed her that evening.  On January 29, Sharon 
appeared in court, was assigned counsel and requested a § 1028 hearing. 235 
The hearing began on January 31, 2013.  The Family Court judge, Judge 
Gruebel, decided to immediately return Joy to Sharon, stating: 
ACS has failed to establish imminent risk of harm, and that continued services 
can minimize the risk of harm to the child in the care of her mother.  Further the 
Court finds that the risk of harm due to the removal of this child from her 
mother and placement in non-kinship foster care, with a visitation schedule, 
outweighs the risk of being with the parent.236 
The court cited Nicholson in the decision, noting that the court must balance 
the risk of harm from being in the parent’s care against the risk of harm that their 
removal might cause.237 The court determined that the concerns about Sharon 
relating to the conditions of her apartment, her psychological condition, and the 
failure to obtain immunizations for Joy had all been addressed or could be 
addressed with better services from ACS.  The court further noted that when 
ACS originally filed its petition, they had decided to “have the child remain with 
the mother with ‘Court ordered supervision.’”  They changed their view and 
sought removal of the child because at the Child’s Safety Conference the mother 
 
234.  Id.  
235. Section 1028 of the New York Family Court Act provides that when a child has been 
removed from the home of his or her parent, the parent may request a hearing at any time to 
determine whether the child should be returned home.  At this hearing, the burden is on the child 
protective agency to demonstrate that the child should not be returned to the home. The statute 
provides that the court shall return the child to the parent unless it finds “imminent risk” to the 
child’s life or health needs. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 1028 (McKinney 2014).  In Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 
820 N.E. 2d. 840, 845 (N.Y. 2004), the court held that imminent danger “must be near or impending, 
not merely possible,” and the court must weigh whether the imminent risk to the child can be 
mitigated by reasonable efforts to avoid removal and must balance the risk the removal might bring.  
236.  Interview with Megan Brown, Staff Attorney, Brooklyn Defender Services (unpublished 
documents on file with Brooklyn Defender Services).  
237.   Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E. 2d. 840, 852 (N.Y. 2004). 
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stormed out stating that she was ‘going to kill the respondent father’ (the alleged 
source of the anonymous call to the hotline that precipitated the investigation 
and conference).”238  These remarks, uttered in frustration and fear, were the 
basis for ACS’s decision to revisit the case, arguing that there was imminent risk 
based on prior incidents. However, “[ACS] used those remarks to review what 
had previously not been [sic] viewed as substantially concerning, to argue that 
this is imminent risk.”  The court found that Sharon needed ongoing support and 
services, but that the risk of harm from removal would be greater than the risk of 
harm keeping Joy with her mother. 
This case illustrates the difficulty of implementing the Nicholson approach in 
the field.  Caseworkers appear more concerned with controlling the behavior of a 
victim by using removal of children as a weapon to assert control. 
C. In the B. Children239 
Adawna was a twenty-eight-year old Latina woman living in Brooklyn.  She 
had three children: nine-year old twins and an infant. She was separated from 
the children’s father, and was on the verge of being evicted from her home when 
she became involved with James, who was also twenty-eight years old.  
Although Adawna had a supportive family and was planning to go to live with 
her grandmother, James was persuasive and convinced her to live with him.  
Adawna had been experiencing difficulties ensuring that her older children 
attended school on a regular basis, which led to ACS becoming involved with the 
family.  James encouraged her to send the twins to live with their father, and she 
moved into his home with her youngest child, Janisse. 
Once Adawna moved in with James, he began to isolate her; he prevented 
her from communicating with her family and friends. At the same time, the 
children’s father was not properly caring for their children.  In particular, he was 
ineffective at ensuring that the twins attended school.  After Adawna’s family 
did not hear for her for several months, they became concerned and begged ACS 
to try to locate her. 
ACS did attempt to find her, and an ACS worker was able to make contact 
with Adawna and arranged to meet with her.  James would only allow the ACS 
employee to meet with Adawna in public and in his presence, and he made sure 
he was sitting right next to Adawna on a bench.  He was clearly controlling her 
speech and movements.  Following this encounter, Adawna disappeared for two 
more months, and no one heard from her during that time. 
The neighbors in her building began to complain of unusual noises coming 
from James’ apartment.  On May 29, 2012, the police responded to a call from the 
landlord and reportedly found the baby and Adawna tied and bound with duct 
tape.  James was in the room when they arrived, and they arrested him.  The 
police found wounds over both of Janisse’s and Adawna’s bodies, and they 
found Janisse emaciated and malnourished.  James had held them captive in a 
 
238.  Interview with Megan Brown, Staff Attorney, Brooklyn Defender Services (unpublished 
documents on file with Brooklyn Defender Services).  
239. Interview with Gabriel Freiman, Staff Attorney, Brooklyn Defender Services (unpublished 
documents on file with Brooklyn Defender Services).   
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room for three months; they had not been allowed to leave the room for any 
reason. 
Adawna stated that James physically and verbally abused her in the 
presence of her child and refused to allow her to eat or leave the home.  She was 
fearful that he would kill her and Janisse because he had previously threatened 
to do so if she left him.  This is the exact quandary that victims of domestic 
violence encounter when they become trapped in a cycle of power, violence and 
control by their abusers.240 
Following her rescue, Adawna more than adequately met her children’s 
needs.  She had her older children return to her house.  She arranged for medical 
appointments, took Janisse for evaluations and signed her up for school.  She 
found supportive services for herself and her family without the assistance of 
ACS.  Nevertheless, ACS brought a neglect proceeding against Adawna.  This 
proceeding placed further trauma and strain on Adawna and her young 
daughter as they tried to heal from their traumatic experience.241  ACS included 
the older children in the neglect petition and subsequently released them to the 
care of their father, who had been inadequately caring for them.  This was not a 
rational response to the situation and appears to be punishment of Adawna 
merely for being a victim of abuse. 
When Adawna appeared in Family Court for the first time, she was by 
herself, without counsel, and ACS informed her that she would be seeing her 
abuser in the courtroom.  Her caseworker’s only advice was “not to look at 
him.”242  When her assigned counsel met her, she was in a state of total panic 
about seeing her abuser for the first time since she was rescued.  This shows a 
lack of training and sensitivity on the part of caseworkers at ACS in dealing with 
a victim who has experienced such a traumatic event. 
In addition, despite the fact that the father had eleven domestic violence 
incident reports against him, ACS then advised the father of the children to file 
for sole custody and to call the police against Adawna if she gave him any 
problems.  Although ACS stated that they were in the process of attempting to 
work out a visitation plan, their objective was clearly to separate Adawna from 
her children. ACS’s approach seems illogical since they had complete access to 
previous reports and knew that the father had a long history of violence. In 
addition, the father actually had no interest in having custody of the children and 
had stated that he wanted them to return to living with their mother. 
In a meeting with Adawna to review her situation, ACS discovered that she 
was taking her children to therapy to help them process the events they had 
experienced.  ACS reacted as though this was a negative, rather than a helpful, 
effort by a concerned mother.  ACS immediately threatened to hold a child safety 
conference to discuss removal. The mother was properly taking advantage of 
available social services to help her family, and as a consequence ACS was 
attempting to remove her children. The approach ACS took was traumatic for the 
family and shows a lack of understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence.  
 
240.  Letter from Brooklyn Family Defense Project to Family Court Legal Services, July 13, 2012 
(on file with author) (discussing  Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E. 2d. 840 (N.Y. 2004). 
241.  Id. 
242.  Id. 
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Instead of using their abilities to support her as a survivor of abuse, ACS 
appeared to blame Adawna for the violence, and attempted to undermine her 
efforts to create a better life for her family. 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
“Because the psychological and physical risks to children in placement can be as 
great, or greater, than allowing them to remain in situations where protections 
are unsure, the balance of harms is a critical piece to be worked out jointly with 
the non-offending parent.”243 
A review of neglect proceedings brought by ACS against victims of 
domestic violence over the past ten years suggests that the family courts are 
attempting to comply with Nicholson.  The number of children entering the foster 
care system decreased by 22% between 2003 and 2012 from 13,598 to 10,594.244  It 
is now rare that the Court upholds the removal of children from a battered 
mother solely because she is a victim of domestic violence.  However, ACS 
practices appear to still fall short of fully implementing the tenets of Nicholson. 
ACS has made improvements in holding abusers accountable, but still 
regularly alleges neglect against battered mothers, who are much easier targets.  
As evidenced by the situations described above, there are still instances where 
the implementation of Nicholson has fallen short of its directives.  ACS still fails to 
consistently offer adequate services to victims of domestic violence before 
prosecuting them or removing their children.  There are a variety of preventive 
services that ACS should offer to families experiencing domestic violence.  These 
include offering adequate shelters, family and individual therapy, legal 
advocacy, medical advocacy, social service referrals and advocacy, parenting 
skills classes, employment referrals and housing assistance.245 While ACS has 
improved the general availability of these programs, they are still not in 
adequate supply. According to the information provided on the ACS website, it 
is the caseworker’s responsibility to identify the services necessary to protect the 
child and help the family.246  Nevertheless, as evidenced by In Re David G., In Re 
Joy, and In the Matter of B. Children, it seems too tempting to take the easiest 
solution of removing a child, rather than following the time-intensive path of 
focusing more intently on service provision and attacking the underlying 
problems.  ACS employees are often too ready to judge victims and may not be 
properly trained to make sensitive decisions and balance outcomes. 
ACS continues to inadequately train its employees regarding domestic 
violence and fails to incorporate domestic violence expertise into the standards 
against which case workers and supervisors are held.  Although the 
requirements to become an ACS caseworker include a college degree with 
“twenty-four credits in any combination of social work, psychology, sociology, 
 
243.  Stark, supra note 2, at 709.  
244.  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, FOSTER CARE FY2003-FY2011 ENTRIES, 
EXITS, AND NUMBERS OF CHILDREN IN CARE ON THE LAST DAY OF EACH FEDERAL FISCAL YEAR , available 
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb. 
245. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).  
 246. Preventative Services, N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILD. SERVS., http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs 
/html/support_families/preventive_services.shtml (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). 
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human services, criminal justice, education. . .nursing, or cultural 
anthropology,”247 there is no requirement to be trained in domestic violence 
prevention or counseling.  Caseworkers have tremendous discretion to remove 
children, unbridled by adequate supervision.248  Without sufficient 
understanding of the complications surrounding domestic violence, there cannot 
be a complete assessment of the family situation. In fact, “[d]espite evidence that 
some proportion of battered women experience moderate to severe symptoms of 
depression, post-traumatic stress disorders or other mental health or behavioral 
problems, there is no evidence that their capacity to parent is compromised as a 
result.”249 
The manner in which caseworkers treat female victims of violence has 
implications for their recovery and the well-being of their families.  Treating 
victims with respect, offering positive support, and giving them a sense of 
control increases the odds of positive outcomes.250  Coordinated efforts by city 
agencies, and the perception by victims that there are coordinated approaches, 
improves the recovery of victims.251A more coordinated approach to assisting 
victims of domestic violence would require community agencies to work 
together.  These agencies should represent law enforcement, prosecution, 
nonprofit victim service agencies and the medical and legal communities.  The 
New York City Mayor’s Office to Combat Domestic Violence, created under 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg, is a vital but insufficient step towards creating this 
coordination.  This Office has opened Family Justice Centers in several boroughs 
in New York, where victims of domestic violence can receive criminal justice, 
civil legal and social services in one location.  The Mayor’s Office needs to 
coordinate these centers with ACS to create adequate assistance and equal 
treatment for all victims of domestic violence. 
There is hope that we will see progress in the practices and policies of ACS.  
In December 2013, Mayor-elect Bill de Blasio named Gladys Carrión as his child 
welfare commissioner for ACS.  In May 2014, Commissioner Carrión announced 
a number of improvements at ACS, including adding staff members and 
improving collaboration with other city agencies.  She has also hired an internal 
monitor to oversee the implementation of the improvements.  ACS now has an 
opportunity to rectify the injustices perpetrated by ACS and to change the 
approach of the agency towards victims of domestic violence and their 
children.252 
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